I work mainly on three areas: the ethical value of imaginings, the role of embodiment in our imaginative capacities and social cognition, and the interaction of ethical and aesthetic values.
The BA funded project “The ethics of imagination” examined the ethical value of different exercises of imagination in virtue of their peculiarities. Contrary to what has been traditionally argued, I defend that imaginings invited by artworks of fiction have no ethical value; these are merely attitude imaginings that are quarantined from the rest of our mental states because they merely involve taking contents “as if”, and thus have no further extra-fictional commitments. Following from this, I argue against the interaction of artworks’ ethical and aesthetic values.
On the other hand, I argue that mental imagery, which has been traditionally regarded as ethically neutral, is in fact significant because of the role it plays in structuring perception of other agents and how we engage with them. For example, I argue that racist mental imagery acquired through our interaction with artistic practices is responsible for aesthetic evaluations that disregard non-white individuals and impact their access to social and material goods.
María Jimena Clavel Vázquez and I have developed an embodied approach to experiential imagination that draws on embodied cognitive science and phenomenology. We propose that experiential imagination is embodied because our social situation is embedded in affective bodily states, and that for this reason our imaginative abilities face significant constraints. As a consequence, we argue that perspective-taking imaginings, which have been traditionally regarded as ethically valuable because of their presumed positive impact on moral concern, can be in fact ethically problematic: experiential imagination can foster a false sense of understanding and empathy toward others in radically different circumstances that cannot motivate genuine moral concern.
In addition to my main research, I'm currently working with María Jimena on aesthetic perception, and have interests in the philosophy of race and the philosophy of Juana Inés de la Cruz.
Please get in touch if you would like to see drafts of my work in progress.
The BA funded project “The ethics of imagination” examined the ethical value of different exercises of imagination in virtue of their peculiarities. Contrary to what has been traditionally argued, I defend that imaginings invited by artworks of fiction have no ethical value; these are merely attitude imaginings that are quarantined from the rest of our mental states because they merely involve taking contents “as if”, and thus have no further extra-fictional commitments. Following from this, I argue against the interaction of artworks’ ethical and aesthetic values.
On the other hand, I argue that mental imagery, which has been traditionally regarded as ethically neutral, is in fact significant because of the role it plays in structuring perception of other agents and how we engage with them. For example, I argue that racist mental imagery acquired through our interaction with artistic practices is responsible for aesthetic evaluations that disregard non-white individuals and impact their access to social and material goods.
María Jimena Clavel Vázquez and I have developed an embodied approach to experiential imagination that draws on embodied cognitive science and phenomenology. We propose that experiential imagination is embodied because our social situation is embedded in affective bodily states, and that for this reason our imaginative abilities face significant constraints. As a consequence, we argue that perspective-taking imaginings, which have been traditionally regarded as ethically valuable because of their presumed positive impact on moral concern, can be in fact ethically problematic: experiential imagination can foster a false sense of understanding and empathy toward others in radically different circumstances that cannot motivate genuine moral concern.
In addition to my main research, I'm currently working with María Jimena on aesthetic perception, and have interests in the philosophy of race and the philosophy of Juana Inés de la Cruz.
Please get in touch if you would like to see drafts of my work in progress.
Work in progress
Ethical and Aesthetic Values
"Situated artworks and aesthetic autonomy"
I argue that if aesthetic autonomy is understood from the situated character of aesthetic objects, we can see how non-aesthetic aims and considerations might contribute to shaping aesthetic objects, while at the same time remaining relevant only insofar as they contribute to the proper appreciation of the object for its own sake.
Embodied imagination
“Embodied imagination and the demands of empathy”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that empathy involves an embodied exercise of imagination insofar as it is embedded in affective bodily states. We conclude that our imaginative capacity for perspective taking faces significant constraints.
“Embodied imagination and empathetic engagement with fiction”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that fiction cannot contribute to our moral understanding by developing empathy and compassion due to the limits of empathetic engagement.
Ethics of imagination
"A defence of response amoralism"
I argue that responses to works of fiction cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction, and that ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives.
Aesthetic perception
“The rhythm of the eye: Imagination, expectations, and aesthetic perception”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez).
Building on an anticipatory view of perception, we argue that aesthetic properties are perceptible because they are brought into perceptual presence when low-level properties of objects are organized in virtue of perceivers’ sensorimotor and affective expectations.
"Situated artworks and aesthetic autonomy"
I argue that if aesthetic autonomy is understood from the situated character of aesthetic objects, we can see how non-aesthetic aims and considerations might contribute to shaping aesthetic objects, while at the same time remaining relevant only insofar as they contribute to the proper appreciation of the object for its own sake.
Embodied imagination
“Embodied imagination and the demands of empathy”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that empathy involves an embodied exercise of imagination insofar as it is embedded in affective bodily states. We conclude that our imaginative capacity for perspective taking faces significant constraints.
“Embodied imagination and empathetic engagement with fiction”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that fiction cannot contribute to our moral understanding by developing empathy and compassion due to the limits of empathetic engagement.
Ethics of imagination
"A defence of response amoralism"
I argue that responses to works of fiction cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction, and that ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives.
Aesthetic perception
“The rhythm of the eye: Imagination, expectations, and aesthetic perception”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez).
Building on an anticipatory view of perception, we argue that aesthetic properties are perceptible because they are brought into perceptual presence when low-level properties of objects are organized in virtue of perceivers’ sensorimotor and affective expectations.