My work mainly focuses on three areas: the interaction of aesthetic and ethical values, the role of social embodiment in our engagement with art, and the ethics of imagination.
Regarding the interaction of aesthetic and ethical values, I defend a version of moderate autonomism that I call Contextual Autonomism, according to which ethical value of artworks does not impact their aesthetic value. Contrary to what has been defended in the literature, I argue that artworks’ ethical flaws stem not from intrinsic features, such as a work’s perspective and the responses it prescribes to appreciators, but from extrinsic features, such as authorial intentions and contextual factors. According to my view, ethical and aesthetic values of artworks remain independent from one another because the ethical assessment of works is always extrinsic and context dependent. Derived from this view, I defend response amoralism in regards to the ethics of our responses to fiction. I argue that because artworks’ ethical flaws don’t stem from intrinsic features, responses to works cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction; ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives. My work also examines how social embodiment impacts imaginative engagement with art. In particular, I argue that gender norms and expectations impact our engagement with fictional others because of their role in appreciators’ interpretive horizons.
I am currently working with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez on a project on embodied imagination. We propose that some exercises of imagination are embodied because our social situation is embedded in affective bodily states, and that for this reason our imaginative abilities face significant constraints. The project explores the consequences of these constraints for our social interactions and our engagement with art. We argue that we should be cautious about assigning empathetic imagination a central role in our moral and art-evaluative practices because it does not lead to affective empathy for those whose circumstances are radically different from our own.
In addition to this, from September onward I’ll be working on a British Academy funded project on the ethics of imagination. The project aims at exploring whether, and under what conditions, it is intrinsically and/or instrumentally good or bad to engage in certain imaginative exercises.
Please get in touch if you would like to see drafts of my work in progress.
Regarding the interaction of aesthetic and ethical values, I defend a version of moderate autonomism that I call Contextual Autonomism, according to which ethical value of artworks does not impact their aesthetic value. Contrary to what has been defended in the literature, I argue that artworks’ ethical flaws stem not from intrinsic features, such as a work’s perspective and the responses it prescribes to appreciators, but from extrinsic features, such as authorial intentions and contextual factors. According to my view, ethical and aesthetic values of artworks remain independent from one another because the ethical assessment of works is always extrinsic and context dependent. Derived from this view, I defend response amoralism in regards to the ethics of our responses to fiction. I argue that because artworks’ ethical flaws don’t stem from intrinsic features, responses to works cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction; ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives. My work also examines how social embodiment impacts imaginative engagement with art. In particular, I argue that gender norms and expectations impact our engagement with fictional others because of their role in appreciators’ interpretive horizons.
I am currently working with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez on a project on embodied imagination. We propose that some exercises of imagination are embodied because our social situation is embedded in affective bodily states, and that for this reason our imaginative abilities face significant constraints. The project explores the consequences of these constraints for our social interactions and our engagement with art. We argue that we should be cautious about assigning empathetic imagination a central role in our moral and art-evaluative practices because it does not lead to affective empathy for those whose circumstances are radically different from our own.
In addition to this, from September onward I’ll be working on a British Academy funded project on the ethics of imagination. The project aims at exploring whether, and under what conditions, it is intrinsically and/or instrumentally good or bad to engage in certain imaginative exercises.
Please get in touch if you would like to see drafts of my work in progress.
Published papers
"Sugar and spice, and everything nice: What rough heroines tell us about imaginative resistance"
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
This paper examines the asymmetry between our engagement with male characters in fictional narratives who transgress moral norms and female characters who do the same. I claim that rough heroines present a new puzzling instance of resistance phenomena that cannot be accounted for by even the most recent accounts of imaginative resistance that incorporate considerations of narrative context, such as genre and narrative artistry. I sketch a solution that points to the violation of gender norms and the challenge to power dynamics as the source of resistance. I argue that rough heroines reveal an important element of narrative engagement that has been largely overlooked in the literature: appreciators’ interpretive horizons.
"Rethinking autonomism: Beauty in a world of moral anarchy"
Philosophy Compass
Advocates of the ethical criticism of art claim that works’ ethical defects or merits have an impact on their aesthetic value. Against ethical critics, autonomists claim that moral criteria should not be part of the considerations when evaluating works of art as art. Autonomism refers to the view that an artwork’s aesthetic value is independent from its ethical value. The purpose of this paper is to examine how autonomism has been defended in the contemporary discussion in analytic aesthetics. I present three versions of autonomism: Richard Posner’s radical autonomism, James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean, and James Harold’s moderate autonomism, and Francisca Pérez Carreño’s robust autonomism. I argue that robust autonomism offers a stronger argument against the ethical critic. However, I point to some difficulties for Pérez Carreño’s account, and conclude by suggesting how further work in autonomism might go around them.
"The diversity of intrinsic ethical flaws in fiction"
Forthcoming, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
I identify two different types of intrinsic ethical defects in artworks, fictional and actual, and argue that this distinction has important consequences for debates surrounding the interaction of ethical and aesthetic values of works of art.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
This paper examines the asymmetry between our engagement with male characters in fictional narratives who transgress moral norms and female characters who do the same. I claim that rough heroines present a new puzzling instance of resistance phenomena that cannot be accounted for by even the most recent accounts of imaginative resistance that incorporate considerations of narrative context, such as genre and narrative artistry. I sketch a solution that points to the violation of gender norms and the challenge to power dynamics as the source of resistance. I argue that rough heroines reveal an important element of narrative engagement that has been largely overlooked in the literature: appreciators’ interpretive horizons.
"Rethinking autonomism: Beauty in a world of moral anarchy"
Philosophy Compass
Advocates of the ethical criticism of art claim that works’ ethical defects or merits have an impact on their aesthetic value. Against ethical critics, autonomists claim that moral criteria should not be part of the considerations when evaluating works of art as art. Autonomism refers to the view that an artwork’s aesthetic value is independent from its ethical value. The purpose of this paper is to examine how autonomism has been defended in the contemporary discussion in analytic aesthetics. I present three versions of autonomism: Richard Posner’s radical autonomism, James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean, and James Harold’s moderate autonomism, and Francisca Pérez Carreño’s robust autonomism. I argue that robust autonomism offers a stronger argument against the ethical critic. However, I point to some difficulties for Pérez Carreño’s account, and conclude by suggesting how further work in autonomism might go around them.
"The diversity of intrinsic ethical flaws in fiction"
Forthcoming, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
I identify two different types of intrinsic ethical defects in artworks, fictional and actual, and argue that this distinction has important consequences for debates surrounding the interaction of ethical and aesthetic values of works of art.
Work in progress
Ethical and Aesthetic Values
"The Case for Contextual Autonomism"
I argue that we cannot properly speak of a work’s intrinsic ethical value, and that thus we can only aspire to an extrinsic ethical assessment that depends entirely on contextual considerations and that cannot sustain interaction with aesthetic value of works.
Embodied imagination
“Embodied imagination and the demands of empathy”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that empathy involves an embodied exercise of imagination insofar as it is embedded in affective bodily states. We conclude that our imaginative capacity for perspective taking faces significant constraints.
“Embodied imagination and empathetic engagement with fiction”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that fiction cannot contribute to our moral understanding by developing empathy and compassion due to the limits of empathetic engagement.
Ethics of imagination
"A defence of response amoralism"
I argue that responses to works of fiction cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction, and that ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives.
“The role of imagination in the aesthetic appreciation of racialized bodies”
I argue that racist mental imagery we have acquired through our interaction with aesthetic practices plays a crucial role in our perception of aesthetic properties of racialized bodies because of top-down influences on perception.
The Philosophy of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz
"The Socratic Pedagogy of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz"
(Co-authored with Sergio Gallegos)
We argue that there is a philosophical pedagogy in Sor Juana’s works and that it is in many respects a Socratic pedagogy. Further, we claim that the development and use of this pedagogy is no accident since it emerges as a reaction to the paternalistic/authoritarian pedagogic model that was imposed by scholastic philosophy in colonial New Spain in the 17th century.
"The aesthetic cognitivism of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz"
(Co-authored with Sergio Gallegos)
In this paper we propose a way of better understanding Sor Juana’s philosophical contributions in her literary work. We argue that Sor Juana’s work should be understood in light of aesthetic cognitivism, acccording to which works of art can convey knowledge through engaging appreciators’ emotions and imagination.
"The Case for Contextual Autonomism"
I argue that we cannot properly speak of a work’s intrinsic ethical value, and that thus we can only aspire to an extrinsic ethical assessment that depends entirely on contextual considerations and that cannot sustain interaction with aesthetic value of works.
Embodied imagination
“Embodied imagination and the demands of empathy”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that empathy involves an embodied exercise of imagination insofar as it is embedded in affective bodily states. We conclude that our imaginative capacity for perspective taking faces significant constraints.
“Embodied imagination and empathetic engagement with fiction”
(Co-authored with María Jimena Clavel Vázquez)
We argue that fiction cannot contribute to our moral understanding by developing empathy and compassion due to the limits of empathetic engagement.
Ethics of imagination
"A defence of response amoralism"
I argue that responses to works of fiction cannot be ethically assessed qua responses to fiction, and that ethical considerations can only have purchase on our responses in virtue of features extrinsic to fictional narratives.
“The role of imagination in the aesthetic appreciation of racialized bodies”
I argue that racist mental imagery we have acquired through our interaction with aesthetic practices plays a crucial role in our perception of aesthetic properties of racialized bodies because of top-down influences on perception.
The Philosophy of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz
"The Socratic Pedagogy of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz"
(Co-authored with Sergio Gallegos)
We argue that there is a philosophical pedagogy in Sor Juana’s works and that it is in many respects a Socratic pedagogy. Further, we claim that the development and use of this pedagogy is no accident since it emerges as a reaction to the paternalistic/authoritarian pedagogic model that was imposed by scholastic philosophy in colonial New Spain in the 17th century.
"The aesthetic cognitivism of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz"
(Co-authored with Sergio Gallegos)
In this paper we propose a way of better understanding Sor Juana’s philosophical contributions in her literary work. We argue that Sor Juana’s work should be understood in light of aesthetic cognitivism, acccording to which works of art can convey knowledge through engaging appreciators’ emotions and imagination.
